Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work by Dubey, Pradeep & Geanakoplos, John
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
7-1-2014 
Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work 
Pradeep Dubey 
John Geanakoplos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dubey, Pradeep and Geanakoplos, John, "Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work" 
(2014). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2358. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2358 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
 
GAMES WITH MONEY AND STATUS: 






























COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
 
 http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/  
Games with Money and Status:
How Best to Incentivize Work∗
Pradeep Dubey† and John Geanakoplos‡
9 July 2014
Abstract
Status is greatly valued in the real world, yet it has not received much at-
tention from economic theorists. We examine how the owner of a firm can best
combine money and status together to get his employees to work hard for the
least total cost. We find that he should motivate workers of low skill mostly by
status and high skill mostly by money. Moreover, he should do so by using a
small number of titles and wage levels. This often results in star wages to the
elite performers.
Keywords: Status, Incentives, Wages
JEL Classification: C70, I20, I30, I33
1 Introduction
Man is moved by the desire for status. Kings wage war for glory, soldiers give their
lives for honor, and gangsters take lives for respect. Donors give more when their
contributions are publicly recognized, and professors write more when they think it
will bring them prestige. Children strive for excellence to win praise, and students
study harder to get better grades. Athletes train longer to win medals and fame, cor-
porate executives work harder to get promotions, and games are played competitively
for the thrill of victory.
In many instances status brings money, suggesting that status is just instrumental
to getting money. But as the last paragraph shows, status is also sought for its own
sake. J.P. Morgan went so far as to say that money is just a way of keeping score,
suggesting that money is often acquired in order to get status. Achilles became
enraged when he was deprived of his booty, less because of its consumption value but
more because of the signal it sent about his rank. Karna1 viewed honor and status as
∗This is a revision, with a slightly altered title, of the second half of Dubey—Geanakoplos (2005).
The authors have recently adopted the convention of alternating the order of their names.
†Center for Game Theory in Economics, SUNY, Stony Brook and Cowles Foundation, Yale Uni-
versity
‡Cowles Foundation, Yale University, and Santa Fe Institute
1 the tragic hero of the epic Mahabharata.
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paramount, donating much of his wealth and refusing to switch to the winning side
in battle, all for the glory of his reputation. Marlon Brando in "On the Waterfront"
laments that in his youthful boxing days he took a dive for the money when he
could instead have fought to win glory: "I coulda been a contender, I coulda been
somebody".
Most societies have used status to motivate their citizens. The ancient Greeks
allocated honorific prizes to the best playwright, the best painter, and the best of
the Achaeans. The French bury their heroes in the Pantheon. The English bestow
knighthood.
The flip side of honor, indeed its negative, is shame or "losing face". The thrill
of victory and the agony of defeat both create incentive for performance. Admiral
Nelson’s exhortation "England expects every many to do his duty" is at once a
promise of honor to those who fight and shame to those who run away.
The question is, what is the most effi cacious way to allocate status? And how
should status incentives and monetary incentives be combined? Should a planner
who wishes to motivate everyone to work with the least expenditure of money deploy
titles to lower all the wages, or is it better for him to actually raise some wages while
lowering others? Should he provide status incentives to performers at the top or at
the bottom? Should he focus on honor or on shame?
We take the essence of status to be the ranking of people created by titles.2 It
is immediately evident that the planner should use status as much as possible, since
titles cost him nothing to bestow, and he should use money only for the residual
incentive. Thus status is prior to money. It undoubtedly played a critical social role
before money was invented, and even in modern times, money payment need not be
contemplated until status incentives are exhausted.
Yet we shall argue that in spite of their costlessness, it is optimal for the planner
who wants to minimize money expenditures to award very few titles. Even though
there may be numerous levels of performance, it would be best for him not to discrim-
inate among them too finely. He should partition them into a few broad categories
and award both titles and wages based on those categories alone. The optimal wage
schedule is a step function, not the steadily increasing curve that would be generated
by a piece rate. The inevitable consequence is that at the cut points of the categories,
a small increase in performance will lead to a higher title and a big jump in wage. We
also show that the partition of performance levels into cells corresponding to differ-
ent titles or wages is stable, depending only on productivity, but not the disutility of
effort or the number of employees. Titles should not change over the business cycle,
even if wage levels do.
One reason for broad categories is that often times higher performance is achieved
by luck or ability rather than effort; steadily increasing rewards for increasing outputs
can reduce effort.3 A second reason is that broad categories generate higher status
2We shall abstract away from the organizational function of titles, and focus only on the status
incentives created by titles.
3 It would be naive to assume that higher output is always a sign of higher skill and better luck
and more effort. This is particularly true when effort must be devoted to mastering multiple tasks.
The low effort employee only gets to the first task; the high effort employee gets to many tasks,
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incentives for employees with lower ability by enabling those who work hard to come
equal in title with workers of higher ability, a little like handicaps do. (The differ-
ence is that handicaps discriminate between people, giving a boost say to minority
candidates, whereas broad categories are anonymous).
We argue further that the planner should incentivize high performers mostly by
money and low performers mostly by status. Indeed we describe circumstances under
which a planner would lower his total wage bill by exorbitantly raising the wages of
a tiny elite of top performers while using titles to motivate the others.
This sounds counterintuitive, but the reason is that a wage increase for middling
performance forces a higher wage for all superior performance, because nobody will
exert effort to strive for superior performance if he can already get a comparable
wage for middling performance. Paying an astronomical wage for elite performance
can thus be less costly than paying a high wage for middling performance.
Finally, we argue that when wages can be kept secret, the planner should further
reduce the number of titles and further concentrate the status incentives on the lowest
performers. We describe circumstances with secret wages under which it is optimal to
award just two titles (member vs non-member) and in which all the status incentive
goes to the very lowest ability group.
In order to make the arguments precise, we build a mathematical approach to
status involving the owner of a firm and his employees, who may have differential
abilities. Employees can either work or shirk. Their output is increasing on average
with effort and ability, but the actual output depends also on chance. The owner
cannot tell in general whether a particular output was caused by effort, ability, or
luck. The owner observes the output of each employee, and on that basis alone awards
him both a title and a wage.4 We suppose that the rewards are non-discriminatory:
employees who produce the same output get the same title and wage. Furthermore,
rewards are merit based in that a unilateral increase in the ouput of any employee
cannot lower his reward: his wage cannot go down, and if his title earlier outranked
another’s it continues to do so.
Status utility has been discussed by many authors from various points of view.5
but then is slightly less good at the first task. Imagine a student who studies just one problem and
can get it right 80% of the time, while the high effort student studies both semesters and can get
each of two problems right 60% of the time. The shirker has probabilities (.2,.8,0) of getting 0,1,
or 2 correct answers, while the high effort student has probabilities (.16.,48,.36). (In the language
we shall shortly introduce, the worker stochastically dominates the shirker, but does not uniformly
stochastically dominate him.) The optimal title partition or wage schedule will turn out to be
{{0,1},{2}} in which the reward comes only for getting both answers right.
4The owner could have considered other more general reward schedules, where the wage and title
of one worker depended on the output of the others. The most common would be a relative reward
schedule in which the top r1 outputs are given the highest award, the next r2 the second highest
and so on. We prove in Section 4 that our absolute scheme is better for the owner than any relative
scheme. But there are still more general schemes we do not investigate.
5There is a large literature on status, starting with Veblen (1899) who famously introduced
conspicuous consumption, i.e., the idea that people strive to consume more than others partly for
the sake of higher status. See Auriol-Renault (2008) for a recent survey of the literature, including
different approaches to the modeling of status
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A major distinction turns on cardinal versus ordinal utility.6 Our model is in the
ordinal tradition. We suppose that every employee gains σ utiles for each person he
outranks and loses σ utiles for each person who outranks him.7 There is some recent
evidence that such utilities are quite prevalent in reality.8
To sum up, if the N employees are paid wages w = (w1, ..., wN ), and awarded
titles t = (t1, ..., tN ), each employee n obtains utility
un(w, t) = un(wn) + σn[#{j : tn > tj} −#{j : tj > tn}]
We suppose that utility u for money is increasing and concave. Our results are
most powerful in the risk neutral case when u is linear, for when there is diminishing
marginal utility, it is very diffi cult to further motivate highly paid employees with
still more money.
Wages could be public or secret. When wages are public, as in state universities
and government offi ces in the United States and many other countries, they enable
or force people to compare themselves with each other. Public wages in effect create
titles along with monetary compensation. In this case an output that gets a higher
wage necessarily gets a higher title, but we do allow titles to go up across outputs
that are given the same wage.9
Sometimes wages can be secret, as happens in many private institutions, such
as Yale University and the Santa Fe Institute, where there is an unspoken rule that
employees do not discuss their salaries. This gives the owner more flexibility, since
he can pick wages and titles completely independently of each other.
To ease the analysis we completely solve two polar extremes. In Section 2 we
consider employees of homogeneous (i.e. ex ante identical) abilities, and in Section
6One strand of the literaure adopts a cardinal approach which makes utility depend on the dif-
ference between an individual’s wage/consumption and others’consumption (see, e.g., Duesenberry
(1949), Pollak (1976), Fehr—Schmidt (1999), and Dubey-Geanakoplos-Haimanko (2013)). The ordi-
nal approach makes utility depend on the individual’s rank in the distribution of consumption (see,
e.g., Frank (1985), Robson (1992), Direr (2001), and Hopkins—Kornienko (2004)). Our model of
status is in the ordinal tradition. This should be contrasted with the purely instrumental role status
might play, for instance when higher consumption signals higher wealth and hence eligibility as a
marriage partner (see e.g., Cole—Mailath—Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998) and Corneo—Jeanne (1998)).
7We introduced this utility function for status in Dubey-Geanakoplos (2005, 2010). In an inter-
esting paper on "Contests for Status" with incomplete information, Moldevanu, Sela, and Shi (2007)
also used the same utility function.
An alternative would be to suppose that status utility comes from being the top dog, or more
generally, is increasing and stricly convex in the number of people an employee outranks. Strict
convexity might arise if higher rank gives higher visibility to the outside world; for example, only the
CEO might enjoy media attention outside the firm. In this paper we are ruling this out, imagining
a closed world in which status utility is derived from the acknowledgment of superior rank by the
other employees; the owner alone is the public face of the company. However our framework can
accommodate such non-linear status utilities, and in particular the existence of optimal wage-title
schedules is not compromised, as we shall show in a sequel paper. The planner will adapt his rewards
depending on how his employees perceive status.
8See for example the article "Does Wage Rank Affect Employees Well-being?" by Brown, Gardner,
Oswald, and Qian (2008).
9We easily accomodate the case where wages alone signify title. If two titles are given the same
wage, we could pay the higher title infinitesimally more if we wanted to identify titles with wages.
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3 we consider employees with disparate abilities.10 In both cases we solve for the
optimal title schedule when wages cannot be paid, the optimal wage schedule when
titles cannot be awarded, and finally the optimal wage-title schedule. For homoge-
neous workers it turns out that the optimal title schedule remains the same after it
becomes possible to pay public wages as well (and thus there is nothing to be gained
by keeping wages secret), but for disparate workers, the optimal title schedule must
be adjusted once wages are introduced (and thus the owner can exploit secret wages).
In both the homogeneous and disparate cases, increasing performance near the low
end brings more status but not much more wages, while at the high end, increasing
performance can bring huge additional money bonuses. In both cases the star like
quality of the wage schedule is increased as status becomes more important.
The general case of employees with overlapping abilities – which lies in between
our extremes – is no doubt important, and our framework makes it clear that optimal
wage-title schedules exist in this case as well, though their precise structure is not
investigated here.
Furthermore, for the most part we assume complete information, i.e. each em-
ployee knows not only his own ability, but also the population distribution of abilities
of his rivals. In Section 5 we show that our results remain essentially intact with
incomplete information where each employee has a probability distribution on the
abilities of each of his rivals but does not know their actual realizations.
2 Homogeneous Employees
We first consider the case of N homogeneous, i.e. ex ante identical, employees.
For simplicity suppose that the possible outputs lie in a finite11 set Q ⊂ R+, with
maximum xmax and minimum xmin. If any employee works, his output is a random
variable X with density f on Q, and if he shirks it is a random variable Y with density
g on Q. For any subset A ⊂ Q, let f(A) =
∑
x∈A f(x) and g(A) =
∑
x∈A g(x). We
suppose that the output of each employee is statistically independent of the others’
outputs regardless of their effort levels.12 The disutility for switching from shirk to
work is denoted by dn > 0 for all employees n. Since employees are ex ante identical,
we take σn = σ, un = u, dn = d for all employees n.
We make the productivity assumption that the worker on average produces more
10These were also the center of attention in Dubey-Geanakoplos (2010), in the scenario where
wages were not present, and students were rewarded solely by titles/grades based on their exam
scores.
11 If Q is a compact interval, we can approximate it by a fine finite grid and then use a limiting
argument to derive the analogous result for a continuum of outputs.
12We assumed independence for ease of exposition. Our analysis goes through with a weaker
hypothesis consisting of two parts. (a) If N-1 employees work and one shirks, then the shirker’s
performance g is independent of the workers’performance, each of which is given by f (which need
not be independent from each other). (b) If they all work, their outputs (which can be distributed
according to h 6= f) are ex ante symmetric in the following precise sense: consider an elementary event
in which every person is assigned an output, and another elementary event obtained by permuting
the names; then the two elementary events should have the same probability.
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Without loss of generality, for x ∈ Q, either f(x) > 0 or g(x) > 0.
We begin by studying absolute reward schedules (P, w), where P is the titles
partition and w is the wage schedule. Later, in Section 5, we shall show that relative
reward schedules are inferior.
In the absolute schedule, there is a partition P of Q into consecutive cells (in-
tervals) corresponding to increasing titles; P(x) denotes the cell of P in which x
lies. There is also a wage schedule given by a weakly monotonic function w : Q →
[wmin,∞), mapping outputs to wages above some stipulated minimum wmin ≥ 0. If
wages are public, then w must be measurable with respect to P, that is constant on
each cell of P, meaning that outputs which get the same title cannot get different
wages. The collection of wage schedules that are measurable with respect to P is
denoted W(P). Let Π be the (finite) set of partitions of Q into consecutive cells,
denoting all possible ways P of allocating titles. Let W ≡ ∪{W(P) : P ∈ P} denote
the collection of all wage schedules, i.e. the set of all weakly monotonic functions
w : Q→ [wmin,∞).
Let I(P) denote the status incentive generated by P when σn = σ = 1, i.e. the
increase in payoff of an employee when he switches from shirk to work, assuming that
all others are working, ignoring money altogether and considering only titles. (The
status incentive for arbitrary σ ≥ 0 is then σI(P).) Clearly his status payoff is 0
when he works, since he comes ahead of his ex ante identical competitors as often as
he comes behind. Therefore, recalling that performances are independent, his status
incentive is simply N − 1 times the negative of his status payoff when he shirks and
faces exactly one competitor who works.












As we shall see in Section 3.1, it follows from our productivity assumption that IS > 0.









A popular but naive wage schedule is the piece rate in which w(x) = λx for some
fixed scalar λ > 0. If u is linear, the piece rate creates a positive incentive to work
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(on account of the productivity assumption). By increasing λ, the incentive can be
increased to any level desired.
The piece rate is the first wage schedule that comes to mind, because we are so
used to competitive markets. If the worker could sell pieces of his ouput to different
competing firms, then a market price would be established for his output, correspond-
ing to the piece rate. But this logic does not apply to our setting. The worker can
choose among different firms (modeled by his participation constraint, which we in-
troduce at the end of Section 2) but having made the choice he becomes an employee
and must give his entire output to the owner. As long as they remain with the firm,
the employeess are paid according to the policy set by the owner. As we shall see,
the owner will not want to set a piece rate.
More generally, if u is concave, we can define a wage schedule w̃(x) so that u(w̃(x))
is linear in x. Indeed, fix 0 < λ < (supw∈R u(w) − u(wmin))/(xmax − xmin). Let
w̃(x) = u−1(u(wmin) + λ(x− xmin)) for all x ∈ Q.
From the productivity assumption, this wage schedule gives positive incentive to
work. Hence IM > 0. Furthermore, if u(w) → ∞ as w → ∞, then we can take λ
arbitrarily large and the incentive to work becomes arbitrarily large, hence IM =∞.
The piece rate schedule and its adapted version for concave u is simple but not
economical. We shall shortly derive a much less costly wage schedule that gives the
same incentive to work.
Consider the general problem of selecting the optimal reward (i.e. wage-title)









σI(P) + I(w) ≥ d
P ∈ Π, w ∈ W
w ∈ W(P) if wages are public
The optimal absolute reward schedule turns out to be quite simple for ex ante
identical employees. To find it we break the analysis into two parts. Throughout we
keep f, g fixed, and examine the solution as d varies.
In Section 3.1 we solve the pure titles problem. We ask how the owner could best
use titles to motivate his employees to work, without handing out any money at all,
i.e., we characterize all partitions P such that I(P) = IS . It turns out that these
partitions can be identified by the easily checked "inside and outside" conditions.
Furthermore, we show that they form a (complete) sublattice of the lattice of all
partitions, with maximal element P∗ and minimal element P∗. It is evident that
this sublattice is the set of all solutions to the minimization problem above, for each
13We implicitly assume that the output of the worker is so valuable to the employer relative to the
wages he needs to pay in order to get them to work, that he deems it optimal to incentivize everyone
to work.
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d ≤ σIS ; and that there are no solutions without wages when d > σIS . Finally, for
generic f, g the sublattice is a singleton.
A typical property of optimal partitions is that they are coarse, clumping many
outputs into the same cell: there are far fewer titles than outputs. In fact, only in
the very special scenario where f uniformly stochastically dominates g do we get as
many titles as outputs in an optimal solution.
In Section 3.2 we solve the pure wage problem. We ask how the owner should best
choose a wage schedule when his employees derive no status utility from titles, i.e.,
which wd ∈ W solve the minimization problem above when σ = 0? This is the classical
pure wage problem. It has a solution for all d ≤ IM . We show that the solution to
the pure wage problem is connected to the pure titles problem. Every solution wd
of the pure wage problem is measurable with respect to the finest partition P∗ that
solves the pure titles problem.
Thus the optimal wage schedule gives even fewer wage levels than there are titles.
This is a far cry from a piece rate schedule where wages strictly increase with each
output. The optimal wage schedule is a step function with broad steps. At the jump
points, a small increase in output is rewarded with a huge increase in wage.
This is even more starkly true when employees are risk neutral. In this case, wd
can be taken to be a "trigger wage" or "star wage": outputs below a threshold q∗ are
paid wmin and those above q∗ get a bonus wmin +B, i.e. we get just two wage levels
no matter how many outputs. Moreover, for generic f and g, the optimal wage must
be of the trigger form. In the special case where f uniformly stochastically dominates
g, the bonus is given only to the very top element of Q and the trigger wage is really
a "star’s" wage.
When titles and wages are combined, the optimal wage-title schedule is achieved
simply by the superposition of the pure titles solution and the pure wage solution just
described, and this is so whether wages are public or secret.14 Since the owner is trying
to minimize the wage bill, he will first try to see how far he can go via titles alone
before putting up money to motivate his workers. We find that for all 0 < d ≤ σIS , it
is optimal to choose any partition P that solved the pure titles problem. No wages are
necessary. For σIS < d ≤ σIS + IM , the same titles partition P can be accompanied
by the wage schedule wd−σIS that solved the pure wage problem for disutility d−σIS .
It makes no difference whether wages are public or secret. For d > σIS + IM , no
solution is possible.
When u is concave and satisfies increasing relative risk aversion, we show that as
σ increases the optimal wage schedule becomes more and more trigger like. Thus as
society becomes more status conscious, wages become more unequal. We prove these
results over the next three sections.
2.1 Titles Alone
We examine the incentive to work created by titles alone, and ask which P maximizes
I(P). Such a P is optimal in the sense that if any other title scheme P ′ ∈ Π gets
14This is surprising because the pure titles partition implements work as a Nash equilibrium in the
N-person game, whereas the optimal pure wage schedule implements work in a one-person problem.
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employees to work via status incentive alone, so will P. To characterize optimal P,
we need to recall two notions of stochastic dominance.
2.1.1 Stochastic Dominance
Definition: Let X and Y be independent random variables which take on values
in a finite totally ordered set Z.15 We say that X (stochastically) dominates Y on
the interval [a, b] ⊂ Z if Pr(X ∈ [a, b]) Pr(Y ∈ [a, b]) = 0, or
Pr(X ∈ [θ, b]|X ∈ [a, b])− Pr(Y ∈ [θ, b]|Y ∈ [a, b]) ≥ 0,
for all θ ∈ (a, b]. In this case we write
X % Y on [a, b].
In words, this means that no matter at what point θ we cut the interval [a, b], con-
ditional on both X and Y lying in [a, b], X is at least as likely to lie in the upper
segment as Y. If every cut on [a, b] gives a strict inequality, then we say that X strictly
dominates Y and we denote it by X  Y on [a, b].
With this definition in hand, we can show that IS > 0. Let X ∼ f and Y ∼ g
denote the stochastic outputs of the worker and the shirker. First note that Y cannot
stochastically dominate X on Q, otherwise, by the "dominance increases expectation




x∈Q g(x)x, contradicting the productivity
assumption. Therefore there exists a θ ∈ Q such that Pr(X ≥ θ) − Pr(Y ≥ θ) > 0.
Partition Q into two titles: let all outputs less than θ be accorded the low title, and
all outputs θ and above be given the high title. This clearly generates positive status
incentive, hence IS > 0.
A moment’s thought will convince the reader that X % Y on [a, b] if and only if
whenever [a, b] = L∪R is divided into two disjoint intervals, the left interval L lying
below the right interval R, then
P (X ∈ L)
P (Y ∈ L) ≤
P (X ∈ R)
P (Y ∈ R)
This is obviously equivalent to the "betweenness" property
P (X ∈ L)
P (Y ∈ L) ≤
P (X ∈ L ∪R)
P (Y ∈ L ∪R) ≤
P (X ∈ R)
P (Y ∈ R)
In the case of strict domination, these inequalities will be strict.
It will be useful to consider a strengthened form of domination.
15As before, we assume without loss of generality that for each a ∈ Z, either Pr(X = a) > 0 or
Pr(Y = a) > 0.
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Definition: We say that X uniformly dominates Y on the interval [c, d] ⊂ Z if X
dominates Y on every subinterval [a, b] ⊂ [c, d]. In this case we write X %U Y on
[c, d].
Uniform domination X %U Y on [c, d] can easily be seen to be equivalent to the
condition that whenever a < b are consecutive elements of [c, d] then
P (X = a)
P (Y = a)
≤ P (X = b)
P (Y = b)
In case [c, d] consists of two elements, domination and uniform domination are the
same. But with three elements or more, uniform domination is a strictly stronger
requirement. Strict uniform domination, denotedX U Y, is defined just like uniform
domination, but with strict inequalities throughout.
2.1.2 The Optimal Titles Partition
To create the best incentives for work, we need to lower the shirker’s payoff as much
as possible. Thus it stands to reason that we should mask performance in regions of
ouput where the shirker is better than the worker, by awarding the same title through-
out; and award titles for superior performance across regions where the worker is likely
to do better. These are reflected in the inside and outside domination conditions of
our first Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Inside-Outside Condition): Let X,Y denote the random output
of the employee when he works, shirks. Then I(P) is maximized over Π at P̄ if and
only if
(i) Inside Domination: Y  X on each cell of P̄
(ii) Outside Uniform Domination: X U Y across the cells of the ordered set P̄
(The proof of Theorem 1 and all other omitted proofs can be found in the Ap-
pendix.)
Given that X and Y both lie somewhere in two consecutive partition cells, con-
dition (ii) says that X is more likely than Y to lie in the upper cell. But given that
X and Y lie in the same cell, condition (i) says that it is more likely that Y is to the
right of any cut.
One might have thought that since titles create status incentive and are free to
bestow, the owner should hand out as many titles as he can. However, an optimal
partition often involves masked cells. Indeed we have







Then x and y must be in the same cell of any optimal titles partition. In particular,
an optimal titles partition can be perfectly fine (and hand out as many titles as there
are outputs) only if X U Y.
In the special case where the worker uniformly dominates the shirker, we do get
the opposite.
Lemma 2 (Fine Partition): Suppose X U Y. Then the perfectly fine partition
is optimal. If X U Y, then the perfectly fine partition is the unique optimum.
For examples and discussion see Dubey-Geanakoplos (2005, 2010).
The set of all optimal partitions turns out to be a lattice. Recall that the join
of two partitions is the coarsest partition that refines them both, and that the meet
is the finest partition that they both refine. In our case of interval partitions of
totally ordered finite sets, the partitions are easily identified with their cuts, i.e. the
boundary points of the intervals.16 Then the join of two partitions is defined by the
union of their cuts, and the meet is defined by the intersection of the cuts.
Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure): The optimal partitions form a sublattice, under
the join and meet operations, of the lattice of all partitions. Thus there is a unique
optimal title partition with the most titles, obtained by taking the join of all the
optimal partitions; this maximal optimal partition is the unique optimal partition
that displays strict inside domination on each of its cells. There is also a unique
optimal title partition with the fewest titles, obtained by taking the meet of all the
optimal partitions; this minimal optimal partition is the unique optimal partition that
displays strict outside domination. Finally, the sublattice is complete, i.e. it includes
all the elements of the lattice between the meet and the join. Indeed, each cell in
any partition in the sublattice is the union of consecutive cells C from the maximal
optimal partition across which f(C)/g(C) is constant.
According to Theorem 2, every optimal partition is obtained by consolidating
some of the titles of the maximal optimal partition or equivalently by splitting some
of the titles of the minimal optimal partition. For example, the fewest titles (in the
minimal optimal title partition) might be general, colonel, major, captain, lieutenant,
sargeant, corporal, private. The most titles (in the maximal optimal title partition)
might be lieutetant general, major general, brigadier general, ..., private first class,
private second class and so on.
The proof of Theorem 1 was given in a more general setting in Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2005, 2010). For completeness, and because the proof is so much simpler and possibly
more instructive in the finite output case considered in this paper, we present it in
the Appendix. Theorem 2 is presented here for the first time.
It is worth noting that the lattice is usually a singleton.
16Formally speaking, a cut is defined by a pair ab where a is a last element of one interval and b
is the first element of the next interval.
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Lemma 3 (Unicity of the Lattice): Regarding f and g as vectors in the finite
dimensional set RQ, the optimal partiton is unique for (Lebesgue) almost all f, g.
2.1.3 Computing the Minimal and Maximal Optimal Titles Partitions
We shall provide two algorithms for computing the minimal optimal partition P∗.
Once we have P∗ it is straightforward to construct P∗.
The First Algorithm for the Minimal Optimal Partition Start with the
finest possible partition of Q into singleton cells. Trivially this partition satisfies the
inside condition. Proceed inductively as follows.
Given any partition (...D < C < B < A) satisfying the inside condition on each
cell, starting from the right look at all pairs of consecutive cells, BA,CB,DC, etc.





If no such pair can be found, then by the inside-outside condition of Theorem 1,
we have an optimal partition; and, by the lattice structure of Theorem 2, it is the
minimal optimal partition.
Otherwise, combine cells β and α into the bigger cell β∪α. By the merger lemma
in the Appendix, this new partiton must also satisfy the inside condition on each of
its cells. Iterate the process. Since Q is finite, the process must terminate. 





If there are multiple such maximizers, choose the smallest. Then define the rightmost






Again choose the lowest such maximizers in case there are ties. Then define Ck+1 =
{q ∈ Q : θ∗k+1 ≤ q < θ∗k}. This algorithm terminates in a partition after at most |Q|
steps.
It remains to check that the constructed partition satisfies the inside and outside






then by betweenness, θk+1 would have done better than θk in the kth maximization
problem, a contradiction. This establishes the outside condition.
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otherwise, by the betweenness property, θ would do better than θk in the kth maxi-
mization problem. This establishes the inside condition.
Algorithm for the Maximal Optimal Partition Given any optimal partition
P, it is a simple matter to construct the maximal optimal partition P∗. Simply look
at all cuts of any cell C in P. If the cut leaves f/g the same on both sides, make it.
By the splitting lemma in the appendix, the new partition satisfies the inside-outside
conditions. Continue iterating the process. By Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure) the
algorithm can only stop at the maximal optimal partition.
2.2 Wages Alone
Now we turn to the classical pure wage problem where employees do not care about
status, but only about money, and hence must be motivated by wages alone. Sur-
prisingly, we find that to minimize his total wage bill, the owner must always pick
a wage schedule that is measurable with respect to the maximal optimal partition
P∗ for the pure titles problem, and may always pick it measurable with respect to
the minimal optimal partition P∗. In other words the pure wage solution never pays
differently to outputs that are accorded the same title in the pure titles solution P∗.
In the pure wage problem people don’t compare themselves with each other, and only
think about what money can buy. In the pure titles problem they don’t care about
money, but only about how they rank against others. Nonetheless, the solutions to
these diametrically opposed problems are in harmony. Indeed, our characterization
of the optimal titles partition vastly simplifies the search for the optimal pure wage
schedule.
From now on we shall make the not unrealistic assumption that the disutility of
work is high enough that no employee will work for status alone
d > σIS
Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Pure Wages and Pure Titles): Any solution









[f(x)− g(x)]u(w(x)) ≥ d
is measurable with respect to the maximal optimal titles partition P∗. Furthermore,
there exists a solution that is measurable with respect to the minimal optimal titles
partition P∗.
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The next theorem shows that every optimal pure wage schedule pays the minimal
wage for a nontrivial initial segment of outputs.
Theorem 4 (Minimum Wage with Risk Aversion) Let the maximal optimal
titles partition P∗ consist of consecutive cells C1, ..., CK . Let f(Ck) ≤ g(Ck). (Clearly
there must be one such k, since
∑
f(Ck) = 1 =
∑
g(Ck)). Then, for every solution
w of the pure wage problem given above, w(x) = wmin for all x ∈ C1 ∪ ... ∪ Ck.
A surprising Corollary of Theorem 4 is that with strict risk aversion, there is a
unique optimal pure wage schedule.
Corollary to Theorem 4 (Uniqueness with Strict Risk Aversion) If u is
strictly concave, then the pure wage problem has a unique solution.
The next theorem shows that there is always an optimal pure wage schedule that
is measurable with respect to the coarsest optimal pure title partition P∗ and pays
as before the minimum wage for an initial segment of cells, but is strictly increasing
across all cells thereafter.
Theorem 5 (Wage Structure with Risk Aversion): Let the minimal optimal
titles partition P∗ consist of consecutive cells C1, ..., CL. Let employee utility u be
differentiable. Then there is an optimal pure wage schedule w that is measurable with
respect to P∗, such that w(x) = wmin on a non-empty initial segment x ∈ C1∪ ...∪C`∗













In the special case when employees are risk neutral towards money (i.e. u is
linear), we find that the minimum wage segment stretches all the way to the top cell
of P∗. Thus there is an optimal trigger wage, which is wmin on every cell in P∗ below
the top cell and wmin plus a positive bonus B for all outputs in the top cell. (The
lowest element θ of the top cell triggers the bonus).
Park (1995) derived a trigger wage for risk neutral workers under the much
stronger hypothesis that f uniformly dominates g. He also did not consider risk
averse workers. (He did, however, allow for multiple levels of effort, which under un-
der uniform domination, can be accomodated in our model as well; see the Remark
after Theorem 10). Our approach is also different, linking the pure wage problem to
the pure titles problem.
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Theorem 6 (Trigger Wage with Risk Neutrality): If u is linear, then every
optimal wage schedule must assume the constant value wmin for all outputs below the
top cell of P∗. For any optimal titles partition P, there exists an optimal pure wage
schedule w of the trigger form that pays wmin for all outputs below the top cell of P




and θ is the lowest output in the top cell of P. For almost all f and g, this is the
unique optimal wage schedule.
The next theorem shows that as the disutility of effort falls, the optimal pure
wage schedule becomes more trigger like, as long as u displays increasing relative risk
aversion.
Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with Risk Aversion): Let employee utility u
be differentiable and strictly concave. Suppose wd, we are solutions of the pure wage
problem above for disutilities d < e. Then wd(x) < we(x) whenever we(x) > wmin
and wd(x) = we(x) whenever we(x) = wmin. Suppose in addition that u displays





is strictly increasing in x. Let wmin ≥ 0. Then wd looks more like a trigger wage







2.3 Titles and Wages Together
Having considered titles and wages separately, we are ready to put them together.
One surprise is that the optimal pure titles schedule need not change when wages are
added. Imagine a pre-monetary society in which workers were motivated by titles
alone. Suppose their disutility of work goes up, requiring further motivation from
monetary wages. Then the optimal wage-title deployment would not alter the titles
whatsoever, but on the contrary, simply reinforce them by paying wages according
to the old titles.
Theorem 8 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule): Let wages be secret or public.
Let σIS < d ≤ σIS + IM . (If d ≤ σIS , wages are unnecessary for motivation and
everybody could be paid wmin). Suppose (P, w) is an optimal wage-title schedule.
Then P is a solution for the pure titles problem and w is a solution for the pure wage
problem with d∗ = d − σI(P) in place of d. Moreover, for almost all f and g, the
partition P is uniquely determined.
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Thus with homogenous employees, there is nothing to be gained by keeping wages
secret. Moreover, we should in general expect to see far fewer titles given than there
are outputs, and far fewer wages than there are titles.
These features come starkly to light when employees are risk neutral. There is only
one wage above the minimum, given as a bonus to an elite of top performers. Many
title distinctions may occur below the elite, but all of them are paid the minimum
wage.
Theorem 9 (Star Wages): Suppose u is linear. Then, for generic f and g, the
optimal wage-title schedule w is the trigger wage
w(θ,B)(x) =
{
wmin if x < θ
wmin +B if x ≥ θ




where d∗ = d− σI(P).
If furthermore, f uniformally stochastically dominates g, then the optimal title-
wage schedule pays the minimum wage to every worker who does not achieve the
top-most output, and a giant bonus to those who do.
We are now in a position to examine what happens when σ rises and society
becomes more status conscious. Our main result is that in the presence of increasing
relative risk aversion, increasing status has the effect of making the optimal wage
schedule more star-like.
Theorem 10 (Status Creates Star-Like Wages): Suppose u is twice differ-
entiable and strictly concave, and displays strictly increasing relative risk aversion.
Then as σ rises and the agents become more status conscious, wages fall and become
more trigger like in the sense of Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with Risk Aversion).
Indeed, the move from zero status to σ has the same effect as lowering the disutility
by σIS and finding an optimal pure wage schedule for the diminished disutility.
Remark (Multiple Effort Levels) Suppose utilities are linear and agents have
multiple effort levels e1, ..., em−1, em with corresponding stochastic outputsX1,..., Xm−1, Xm
and disutilities di to switch from effort ei to maximal effort em, for i = 1, ...,m − 1.
Further suppose that Xm uniformly stochastically dominates Xi for i = 1, ...,m− 1.
Then, by Theorem 9 (Star Wages), there exist a bonus Bi at the top-most output
that will most effi ciently motivate each agent to switch from ei to em. But then B̃ =
max [Bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1], given as bonus at the topmost output, will be the best way
to motivate all the agents to put in maximal effort.
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Remark (Participation Constraints) Suppose utilities are concave, not neces-
sarily linear. We could add an ex ante Participation Constraint (PC), over and above
the minimal wage requirement, i.e., the (expected) utility any agent gets, from wages
and titles combined, should never sink below some stipulated floor u∗. We can still
prove that every optimal wage schedule must be measurable with respect to P ∗. To
see this, first note that, when they all work, their (expected) status utility is zero (by
symmetry) and thus the utility they enjoy is just their wage utility. Take any wage
schedule w that satisfies the incentive constraint and the participation constraint.
Suppose w is not measurable with respect to the maximal optimal titles partition
P ∗. Then consider w∗, obtained from from w, exactly as in the proof of Theorem
3 (Compatibility of Pure Wages and Pure Titles). By construction, w∗ leaves the
worker’s wage utility unchanged, hence w∗ satisfies the participation constraint. The
shirker’s utility is worsened in w∗ compared to w, hence the incentive constraint is
satisfied in a stronger manner in w∗. Finally, the total wage bill is not increased.
Thus an optimal wage schedule must be measurable with respect to P ∗.
3 Disparate Employee Types
We now turn to the other extreme in which employees have disparate abilities. For the
sake of a more succinct presentation, output distributions are taken to be continuous.
(The discrete case is completely analogous, but the formulae become messier).
We imagine disparate employee types i = 1, ..., ` arranged in order of ascending
abilities, with Ni employees of type i. Assuming all the others work, an employee of









L] with density gi
when he shirks. Conditional on others’working, his output depends only on chance
and on his own effort, and is independent of all the others’ outputs. We assume






H , i.e., an employee of type i + 1
is so much more able than an employee of type i, that he always comes out ahead
even when he shirks and the other works. In particular, the supports of the densities
gi, fi, gi+1, fi+1 are all disjoint. This corresponds to a situation in which the employees
can be clumped into distinct groups with widely different training or experience or
expertise. The case when ` = 1 is a special instance of the homogeneous employees
we discussed in the last Section.
As in the previous Section with homogeneous employees, it will be useful to
examine first the optimal pure title schedule when wages cannot be paid, and then
the optimal pure wage schedule when titles cannot be conferred. We pass over these
two cases quickly to get to the interesting interplay between wages and titles that
was absent in the homogeneous case.
We shall find that the optimal titles partition gives as many titles as there are
employee types, far fewer than the continuum of output levels. Typically the optimal
pure title partition does not give the highest title to all the employees of the highest
type, and allows for the best performers of the lowest type (and in fact all types
below the top type) to gain a title equal to the worst performers among those one
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ability rank higher. When titles and wages are allocated together, the optimal titles
partition changes. Secret wages make a difference.
When wages are public, the top ability types should be motivated entirely by
wages, and not at all by status (though they get the highest status). A tiny group of
elite performers among the top ability type should get astronomical wages. As status
becomes more important, the disparity in pay between the highest types and all the
other types increases; pay becomes more star like as status becomes more important.
When wages are secret, there should be only two titles, so that all the status incentive
is concentrated on the lowest ability type, and everyone else is motivated by wages.
Until the very end of this section we shall assume that σ = 1. As we said earlier,
this is without loss of generality, since it can always be achieved be appropriately
rescaling utilities.
3.1 Titles Alone
Once again titles will be given on the basis of performance as measured by a partition
P of the output space into consecutive cells, as in the last section with homogeneous
workers. Assuming all others are working, the expected status payoff to an employee
when he works/shirks is given by the expected number of people he beats (according
to P) minus the expected number of people who beat him. His status incentive to
work is his expected status payoff when he works minus his expected status payoff
when he shirks. We begin by proving a lemma:
Lemma 4 (Cuts): Suppose there are ` disparate types, and a given title partition.
Then there is another title partition, with (1) the lowest cut at a1H , (2) at most one
cut in every J iH , i ≥ 1, and (3) no other cuts, which improves (or leaves unchanged)
the status incentive to work of every employee.
Let us denote the cut in J iH by ci, and let pi =
∫ bHi
ci
fi(x)dx be the probability of
the upper tail J iH(ci) = {q ∈ J iH : q ≥ ci}. Since the density fi may be zero on some
intervals, there may be several ci that give upper tails with the same probability.
In this case it is harmless to choose the lowest such cut ci(pi) = min{q ∈ J iH :∫ bHi
q fi(x)dx = pi}.
In view of the cuts lemma, we concentrate our attention on partitions P(p) given
by vector p = (pi1 = p1 = 1, pi2 ..., pik) with cuts at cij (pij ) in J
ij
H , where the first cut
comes at ci1(pi1) = c1(p1) = c1(1) = a
1
H , corresponding to i1 = 1.
Lemma 5 (Optimal Pure Titles): Suppose there are ` disparate types, and a
title partition that gives positive status incentive to work for every employee. Then
there is another title partition consisting of ` cuts, with the lowest cut at a1H , and
exactly one cut in every J iH , i ≥ 1, which improves (or leaves unchanged) the status
incentive to work of every employee.
If there is exactly one cut per type, we may identify the partition P(p) with the
probabilities p = (p1, ..., p`), where p1 = 1.
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The number pi is the probability with which an employee who does put in effort
gets a title corresponding to those of his ability class who do work. To the extent
pi < 1, the incentive of type i employees to work is reduced. On the other hand,
when pi < 1, the status incentive of employees of type i − 1 is enhanced, because
by working then can come equal in status with a fraction 1 − pi of the workers of
type i. Every ability type i ≥ 2 has a substantial status incentive to work because
shirking forces them to be classified with the type i − 1 just below them. But the
lowest ability type i = 1 does not have that incentive.
Suppose there are N1, ...N` employees of type i = 1, ..., `. Given the title partition
p = (p1, ..., p`), the status incentive to work for the ` types is
I1(p) = p1[(N1 − 1) + (1− p2)N2]
Ii(p) = pi[(Ni − 1) + pi−1Ni−1 + (1− pi+1)Ni+1] for 2 ≤ i ≤ `− 1
I`(p) = p`[(N` − 1) + p`−1N`−1].
When working, an employee of type 2 ≤ i ≤ `− 1 might get unlucky, with prob-
ability 1− pi, and find himself no better off than if he shirked. But with probability
pi he will be lucky, outranking the fraction pi−1 of type i − 1 he otherwise would
be equal with, and coming equal with the fraction 1 − pi+1 of type i + 1 he would
otherwise have lost out against. In addition, he either outranks (instead of equalling)
or equals (instead of being outranked by) every employee of his own type. This gives
the formula Ii(p) for 2 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Taking N0 = N`+1 = 0 gives the formulas for
I1(p) and I`(p).
In the case where all disincentives di = d, it is natural to maximize the minimum






Since the Ii(p) are continuous, and since [0, 1]` is compact, an optimal p̃ clearly
exists. For more details, see Section 3 of Dubey-Geanakoplos (2005, 2010), where in
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particular it is shown that if N1 ≤ N2 ≤ ... ≤ N`, then 0 < p̃i < 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ `. (Of
course p̃1 = 1, for why reward any employee of type 1 for shirking.)
3.2 Wages Alone
As in the homogeneous case of the last section, we assume that all agents have the
same concave utility function u for wages. We also assume that u is continuous and
strictly monotonic, with u(x) −→ ∞ as x −→ ∞. If titles confer no status, and the
owner must motivate his employees only by wages, then he must ensure that the wage





It is perfectly clear what needs to be done. The owner would then simply set pi = 1
for all i = 1, ..., ` and compensate each employee for precisely his disutility when he
switches from shirk to work. Since wages must be monotonic in output, this implies
that an optimal pure wage schedule is a step function which pays w0 on [0, a1H) and wi
on [aiH , a
i+1
H ), where w0 < w1 < ..... < wl are defined recursively as follows, starting
with w0 :
w0 = wmin
u(wi)− u(wi−1) = di
(Our assumptions on u guarantee the existence of such a wage schedule for any
wmin, d1, ...., dl.) Without status, wages rise with ability, but in increments deter-
mined entirely by the utility of wages and the disutility of effort. In particular, when
employees are risk neutral, we have that the wage staircase starts at w0 = wmin and
jumps by di at output level aiH .
3.3 Wages and Titles Together
Once again we ask the question: given that the owner can use both titles and wages
as incentives, how should he deploy them together? As we have just seen, solving for
them separately often leads to very different partitions. For example, if di = d for all
i, cuts are in the interior of J iH for pure titles and on its boundary for pure wages.
Superposing the wage schedule onto the pure titles schedule, as in the homogenous
case, is in general not possible.
When wielding wages and titles together, should the owner use money and status
in equal proportions for all employees? Or should he, for example, reserve status
mostly for higher employee types? And does our answer depend on whether the
wages are secret or public?
We begin by showing that Lemma 4 (Cuts) still applies when employees are also
motivated by money.
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Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages): Suppose there are ` disparate types, and an orig-
inal wage-title schedule (with wages secret or public). Then the total incentive to
work of every employee can be improved (or left unchanged) by another wage sched-
ule whose wage bill is unchanged, together with a title partition with the lowest cut at
a1H , and at most one cut in every J
i
H , i ≥ 1, and no other cuts. Furthermore, if the
original wage schedule was public (i.e. measurable with respect to the original titles
partition), then the new wage schedule can also be taken to be public (i.e. measurable
with respect to the new titles partition).
3.3.1 Secret Wages
The owner’s optimization problem is given below for the case of secret wages. He
seeks to minimize his wage bill, subject to incentivizing everyone to work.
Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages) already guarantees that we need only consider at
most one cut per J iH . To allow for the possibility of missing cuts, we consider the
k-vector p = (pi1 = p1 = 1, pi2 ..., pik), where the length k can vary. This defines
the partition P(p) with cuts at cij (pij ) in J
ij
H , where the first cut comes at a
1
H ,
corresponding to i1 = 1. Let Ii(p) denote the status incentive created by the title
partition p for employee-type i. Since wages are secret, they can be set independently
of the title partition p. But then, on account of the concavity of u and the risk-
neutrality of the owner, we might as well take wages to be a constant wi on J iH and
as low as possible (while respecting the constraint of monotonicity) on J iL, namely
17






s.t. Ii(p) + u(wi)− u(wi−1) ≥ di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
0 ≤ pij ≤ 1, for 2 ≤ j ≤ k
1 = i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ik ≤ `
wmin = w0 ≤ w1 ≤ ..... ≤ wl
We require
The Necessity-of-Wages Assumption (Disparate Case):
At any feasible wage-title schedule (p, w), each agent must get a positive wage
incentive (in addition to his status incentive),18.
At first glance one might think that the highest type, who will necessarily wind up
with the highest status payoff, ought to be motivated by status, while the lowest type,
17Consider any weakly monotonic wage function w′ . Let wi denote the average value of w′on J iH
and replace w′ by the step function w = (w0,w1,...., wl) as discussed. Then w will not raise the
expected wage bill, and will create no less wage incentives, compared to w′.
18This is guaranteed if, for example, Ni−1+Ni+Ni+1 < di for all i (with N0 = N`+1 = 0). Would
anybody work for free, just for the status of coming ahead of all his peers?
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who will necessarily wind up with the least status payoff, will need to be motivated
by money. But quite the opposite is true. As we said in the introduction, shame is
the flip side of honor. So status considerations apply at both ends. Furthermore it
is the change in status payoff (or money payoff) upon switching from shirk to work
that counts for incentive, not the absolute payoffs.
Since wages have to be monotonic, giving a raise to the bottom end will push
wages up for all, creating a huge wage bill for the owner. It is to his advantage to
make the initial rung of the wage staircase as low as possible. He can achieve this
by incentivizing the lowest type as much as possible via status, so that the wage
incentive needed for the lowest ability employee is small. When wages are secret, the
employer can indeed concentrate all the status incentive on the lowest type.
Theorem 11 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages and Risk
Neutrality) Suppose there are ` disparate risk-neutral types. Then the optimal
wage-title schedule, when wages can be kept secret, has just two titles, the low title
for outputs below a1H (that would be given to a person of the lowest type were he to
shirk) and the high title for all outputs above a1H . Thus despite the freedom to hand
out titles costlessly, the owner should award every worker the same high title. All
workers above those of type 1 are incentivized by the secret wages alone. So the wage
schedule is a step function where the jump from wi−1 to wi takes place at aiH and
w0 = wmin
w1 = w0 + d1 − (N1 − 1 +N2 + ...+Nl)
wi = wi−1 + di
The above optimal schedule is remeniscent of joining a club, all of whose members
enjoy the same title, although they may secretly be getting different perqs.
Pure Wage Schedule vs Secret-Wage & Title Schedule The optimal pure
wage schedule is a monotonic step function with jumps from wi−1 to wi at at the






H ], satisfying w0 = wmin and, with risk neutral
employees, wi − wi−1 = di. When titles are introduced and wages are secret, the
optimal wage schedule is exactly the same except that the whole wage staircase is
shifted down by (N1 − 1 + N2+ ... + Nl), which is equal to the enormous status
incentive created for the lowest type by the two titles (the shirker of the lowest type
getting the low title and all other outputs the high title). In short, the lowest type is
incentivized as much as possible by status, while the others are motivated by wages
alone.
3.3.2 Public Wages
The owner’s optimization problem is exactly the same as for secret wages, except for
the added constraint that wages must be measurable with respect to titles, i.e., must
be constant across all outputs that are awarded the same title.
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As before, the owner seeks to minimize his wage bill, subject to incentivizing
every employee to work. In light of Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages), we may restrict
attention to title partitions with at most one cut in every J iH . It is easy to see that





the same title, hence employees of type i would have no status incentive to work;
but then, since wages are public, wages would have to be constant across J iL and
J iH , and then employees of type i would have no wage incentive either. Therefore
the title partition is represented by the full vector p = (p1, p2, ..., p`). Denote by
W(p1, p2, ..., p`) the class of wage schedules that are measurable with respect to the
title partition P(p1, p2, ..., p`). One critical aspect of the problem is that we have
capped the maximum wage at an arbitrary, but high, level M .19














s.t. Ĩi ≡ Ii(p) + pi(u(wi)− u(wi−1)) ≥ di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and w ∈ W(p1, p2, ..., p`)
wmin = w0 ≤ w1 ≤ · · · ≤ w` ≤M
The total incentive, Ĩi, of each agent of type i consists, as before, of the status
incentive Ii ≡ Ii(p) plus a wage incentive pi(u(wi)− u(wi−1)).
We shall see that, unlike the case of homogeneous employees, the optimal reward
schedule does not arise by a simple combination of the solutions for titles alone and
wages alone. There is a more intricate interplay between wages and titles. Wages
will now depend on the population distribution of employees N1, ..., N`, as well as
the disutilities of effort d1, ..., d`. But some features stand out independent of the Ni
and di. The most dramatic change to the wage schedule is that now a tiny elite of
top performers will be given exorbitant wages. The title partition will also change.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ `− 1, it is optimal to set pi = 1 so that each of those types surely gets a
higher title by working. Thus the cells Ci of the optimal title partition are as follows:
C0 = J
1
L and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `− 2, Ci = J iH ∪J
i+1
L , and C`−1 = J
`−1
H ∪J `L∪ [J `H\J `H(p`)],
and C` = J `H(p`). In the optimal public-wage & title schedule, p` is not 1 but is close
to 0, meaning that only a tiny fraction consisting of the ultra productive employees
of type ` will be awarded the topmost title when they work, while the majority of
them will be pooled with the second best type `−1. The optimal public-wage & title
schedule is thus vastly different from the optimal pure titles schedule and from the
optimal pure wage schedule.
The CEO is picked by lottery from the senior managing directors (type `). Con-
trary to what one might have guessed, the type ` workers are motivated almost
entirely by the chance of the huge money payoff of the CEO and not by status. On
the other hand, the very next tier of managing directors (type ` − 1) are motivated
heavily by titles. Unlike all the other workers, by working hard they will come equal
19This helps to keep the problem compact. The bound M may also be interpreted as the degree
of inequity aversion in the society (see Fehr-Schmidt (1999)).
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not just with all of their own type but also with virtually all of the type above them.
To sum up, the top tier is motivated by money, the next is motivated as much as
possible by status, and the rest by an even mix of status and money.
To ease the formal exposition of the foregoing discussion, we make the
Differentiability Assumption:
u is continuously differentiable20 (in addition to being concave and strictly monotonic).
More substantially we shall assume that agents become risk-neutral when their
wealth is suffi ciently large. Precisely, we have the condition below (which is auto-
matically satisfied when u is linear):
Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption:
(1) u becomes asymptotically risk-neutral ,i.e., the derivative u′(w) = λ for some
constant λ whenever w exceeds a threshold wτ .
Furthermore, at any feasible wage-title schedule (p, w),
(2) w`−2 > wτ
Part (2) requires disutilities to be suffi ciently more than status incentives (cumu-
latively across the types) so that, by the time the first `−2 agents have been given the
requisite wage increases, the threshold wτ is crossed. Note that if d = (d1, ..., d`) −→
∞,then w = (w1, ..., w`) −→ ∞ in order to keep (p, w) feasible; so (2) is automatic
for large enough d. Tighter suffi cient conditions can easily be stated in terms of the
exogenous data d, u, (Ni)`i=1 of the model in order to guarantee (2), but we leave this
to the reader.
Theorem 12 (Exorbitant Elite Wages): Let there be ` disparate types of work-
ers, with Ni ≥ 1 of each type i = 1, ..., `. Suppose the Necessity of Wages and the
Differentiability Assumptions hold. Then at any optimal wage-title schedule (p, w),
we have pi = 1 for all i = 1, ..., `− 1, so that any two workers of the same type below
` get the same status and wage.
Next assume that the Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption also holds. and that
M is large enough to ensure that λM > λwmin +
∑`
i=1 di (where, recall, λ denotes
the constant value of the derivative u′(w) for w > wτ ).
Then there is a unique optimal status partition and wage schedule (p, w), with
p` ≤ (λwmin +
∑`
i=1 di)/λM < 1, and w` = M . Thus for large M , p` is very small
and a tiny elite p`N` out of the highest type ` is paid the exorbitant salary M , while
the rest of their type obtain the same status and pay as type ` − 1. Thus type `
employees are motivated almost entirely by wages alone.
Theorem 12 gives an explanation for the exorbitant pay often seen at the very
top of some real world hierarchies. It is cheaper to incentivize the managing directors
of type `− 1 as much as possible via status rather than wages. To achieve this they
20This is not essential and Theorem 12 below holds with just concavity of u. Its proof is exactly
the same but with left (right) derivatives of u used to estimate decreases (increases) in u.
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must be able to get the same status as most of the senior managing directors of
type `, if they work hard. This fixes the wage of the latter group at the managing
director’s level. In order to incentivize the senior managing directors, they are given
to understand that the CEO will be chosen from among their rank, and even though
the chance of getting selected is small, the salary is huge. (Denoting the probability
of getting the top CEO title by ε, the status incentive of type l is ε(Nl−1 + (1− ε)Nl)
which is negligible compared to the wage incentive εM, where M is the huge bonus.)
This stratagem of paying a huge salary to the tiny fraction of top performers in
a group is counterproductive at any level below `, because monotonicity would force
the employer to pay all workers of higher type at least as much.
The conclusion that the top ability group is motivated by wages alone has the
consequence that as status grows in importance (σ rises above 1) the pay of everyone
is be reduced, except for the elite performers, who continue to get the same maximum
M, since every group below the top ability group was getting some status incentive
and now can get more. The difference in pay between the elite performers and the
rest must therefore grow, and the fraction of employees getting the same elite wage
must shrink. The wage schedule gets more star like.
3.3.3 Wage Differentials for Disparate Employees
The conclusions about exorbitant pay for the CEO and pi = 1 for all i = 1, ..., `− 1
are quite robust; they hold regardless of the distribution of abilities N1, ..., N`, or the
disutilities of work d1, ..., d`.
But the wage differentials wi − wi−1 for i < ` do depend on the Nj’s and dj’s as
we shall see. For simplicity let us assume u(w) = w for the rest of this section. Our
analysis is based on the following corollary:
Corollary to Theorem 12: Under the conditions of Theorem 11 and with risk
neutrality (u(w) = w ), at the optimum wage-title schedule the title incentives are
I1 = N1 − 1 < I2 = N1 + N2 − 1; Ii = Ni−1 + Ni − 1 for i = 3, ..., ` − 2. Also,
I`−1 = N`−2 + N`−1 + (1 − p`)N` − 1 ≈ N`−2 + N`−1 + N` − 1. Finally, I` =
p`(N`−1 +N` − 1) ≈ 0.
Thus for 2 ≤ i ≤ `− 2,
(wi − wi−1)− (wi−1 − wi−2) = (di − di−1) +Ni−2 −Ni.
A natural case to consider is the one where the populationNi declines in size as the
ability type increases. If disutilities do not fall as fast (i.e., if Ni−2 −Ni > di−1 − di,
which occurs for example, if disutilities are constant), then we conclude from the
corollary that wage differentials escalate as we go up the ability ladder from i = 2 to
i = `− 2.
Another natural case arises in a population that is bell-shaped around the mean
ability. When Ni −Ni−2 > di − di−1 for small i and Ni−2 −Ni > di−1 − di, for large
i, we get a wage schedule which is first concave and then convex.
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The simplest case is when Ni = N ∀i and di = d ∀i. Then the wage rises steadily
by a fixed step of d+ 1− 2N until w`−2, then rises by only d+ 1− 3N to w`−1, then
jumps astronomically to w` = M.
Remark (When public wages confer status): We could have postulated, in-
stead of titles, that status is conferred by wages themselves: wi confers higher status
than wj if, and only if, wi ≥ wj + δ for some threshold δ > 0. Then our last con-
straint in the owner’s optimization problem would read: wmin = w0, wi + δ ≤ wi+1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, w` ≤ M . It is worth noting that as d = (d1, ..., d`) → ∞,
pi(wi−wi−1)→∞ since the status incentive terms Ii`(p) are bounded by N1+· · ·+N`.
Thus the constraints wi + δ ≤ wi+1 are automatically satisfied for large enough d
(given any δ), and our analysis remains intact.
Participation Constraints with Risk Neutrality In the case of disparate agents,
observe that no matter what the underlying partition for the wage-title schedule may
be, the participation constraint (PC) is met by everyone if, and only if, it is met by
an agent of type 1. This is so because his wage utility is never more than that of
the others, on account of the monotonicity of the wages in terms of the output; nor
is his status utility more, since titles are also monotonic and so render it impossible
for him to outrank any higher type. Thus it suffi ces to maintain the PC for type
1. With this in mind, consider the proof of the Exorbitant Elite Wages Theorem.
Start with any wage-title schedule which incentivizes everyone to work, while also
meeting the PC for an agent of type 1. Now read the entire proof without change.We
need only check that the PC for this agent is maintained throughout. But this is
straightforward. Raising p1 boosts both his wage utility and his status utility, so
the PC continues to hold for him. Next, when we raise p2, his status utility does
go down in the amount εN2 . But the subsequent increase of w1 to w̃1 raises his
wage utility in precisely the same amount, so that the PC is still not violated for
him. The rest of the proof proceeds without at all impacting agents of type 1. Hence
the Exorbitant Elite Wages Theorem, and its proof, hold exactly as before, with just
one amendment: in the optimal wage-title schedule that we wind up with, it may be
that w1 is escalated to ensure u(w1) −N2 − .... −Nl = u∗ (thereby meeting the PC
for agents of type 1). There is no other change. The titles-partition and the wage
differentials, starting from w1, stay exactly the same.
4 Relative Wages and Titles
One might wonder whether it would be easier to motivate employees by paying them
relative wages, i.e., wages and titles based on how their performance ranks relative to
their rivals. We can formalize this by a sequence K = (KZ , ...,KB,KA), where the
top KA performers get the highest wage and title, the next KB get the next highest
wage and title, and so on. Ties are broken randomly with equal probability.
The answer is no.
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4.1 Homogeneous Employees
Consider any money payment scheme in which the money payment to an employee
is a function of his output and the output of all the others. Conditional on his
own output, the worker thereby obtains a certain expected utility of the forthcoming
money payment, which is equivalent to getting some wage for certain. (Since he
is risk averse, this certainty equivalent wage is actually smaller than the expected
money payment the owner is making, conditional on the worker’s output.) If this
certainty equivalent wage (thought of as a function of the worker’s output) gives him
the incentive to work, then it must cost the employer at least as much as the optimal
pure wage schedule derived in section 3. Thus in our model, absolute wages cannot
be beaten by relative wages or any other wage scheme, when status considerations
are absent.
On the other hand, with pure status, the optimal absolute partition of the Propo-
sition beats any relative schedule K = (KZ , ...,KB,KA), by Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2005,2010). But as we saw in the Optimal Wage-Titles Theorem, this same parti-
tion also serves for the optimal wage schedule. Thus the same absolute partition gives
more status incentive than any relative scheme, and also gives more wage incentive
than would be generated by any relative scheme. Since status incentives and wage
incentives are additive, this absolute wageititle schedule is better than any relative
schedule.
4.2 Disparate Employees
Consider a general population N = (N1, ..., N`) of ` disparate types, and any relative
wage-title schedule given by K = (KA,KB, ...,KZ), KA + · · · + KZ = N1 + · · · +
N`. (Recall that we don’t need to worry about ties since outcomes are continuously
distributed). We can find an absolute wage-title schedule that creates at least the
same incentives (from status and money combined), while handing out the same
amount of money.
Define absolute grade intervals by the intervals [xA,∞), [xB, xA) and so on, where
the cuts xα are defined by the maximum values solving the equations
KA + · · ·+Kα = Expected number of people with scores in [xα,∞)
assuming everybody works. Award the relative wages and titles on these absolute
intervals. It is easy to check that the absolute wage-title schedule we have defined,
costs the same and creates (using the concavity of u) at least the same incentives.
5 Incomplete Information
We have assumed so far that every player knows the precise characteristics of every
other player, in addition to his own. Our analysis can be modified very easily to acco-
modate incomplete information, i.e., when each player knows his own characteristics
precisely, but has only a probability distribution on those of others.
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First consider our model ofN homogeneous employees, i.e., each produces random
output with the same probability density f, g if he works, shirks (independently of
the effort chosen by the others). In order to introduce incomplete information, let us
suppose that the disutility of effort can take on many possible values d1 < .... < dk.
Nature moves first, independently picking a disutility level for everyone and revealing
to each only his own. An optimal reward schedule must motivate every employee
to work no matter what his disutility level may be. This is clearly equivalent to
motivating an employee to switch from shirk to work when his disutility is the highest
possible (i.e., is dk) and when the remaining N − 1 employees are working. Thus
the optimal reward schedule we have constructed in the complete information case,
when all employees have the common disutility dk, is also the optimal schedule with
incomplete information.
Next consider the case of l disparate ability-types, with disutility di and disjoint
performance intervals J iL < J
i
H for type i, as before. Here the natural game of
incomplete information (that we have in mind) is as follows. Nature moves first,
assigning type i = 1, ..., l randomly to everyone with probabilities that are i.i.d 21
across the employees, say type i is picked with probability θi. Each employee comes
to know his own type and not those of the others, before choosing his effort level.
But the game of course is common knowledge, so each is cognizant of the probability
distribution on types.
The status incentive for any employee of type i is linear in the expected num-
ber of rivals of each type. When there is complete information, these numbers are
deterministically given by the vector (N1, ..., Ni−1, Ni − 1, Ni+1, ..., N`). When there
is incomplete information, this vector does not depend on i, and is always given
by the expected numbers (θ1(N − 1), ..., θ`(N − 1)). Based on this observation, the
entire analysis of the disparate case can be transported from complete information
to incomplete information as follows. Lemma 4 (Cuts) , Lemma 5 (Optimal Pure
Titles), and Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages) all hold mutatis mutandis. Theorem 11
(Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages and Risk Neutrality) holds with a
slight alteration. There is an optimal secret wage-title schedule (though no longer
necessarily unique) that still consists of just one cut at a1H . The formula for wages is
also just the same, except that
w1 = w0 + d1 − (N − 1)
To see this, define νij just as in the proof of Theorem 11 but with each Ni replaced




θi(N − 1) = [(N − 1)/N ]νij ( the expected number of others in Vij , conditional on
one employee – of any type – - standing aside). Then re-read the proof of Theorem
11 with the following amendments: the changes in status incentives are given by the
same formulae replacing νij by ν
∗
ij
throughout and dropping "−1”( thus νi1 + νi2 − 1
is replaced by ν∗i1 + ν
∗
i2
, etc.). Repeating the maneuver of wage changes as we move
to the single cut at a1H , the total change in wage bill is no more than
21What is important is that the probabilities be independent across the employees. We suppose
that they are identically distributed only for ease of notation.
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− (νi1 + νi2 + νi3 + ...+ νik)[ν∗i2 + ν
∗




















But since ν∗ij = [(N−1)/N ]νij we may undo the stars in the above display (scaling
the expression by (N − 1)/N ), which reveals that the displayed expression is 0 as
before. though it may no longer be the unique optimal schedule (as was the case with
complete information).
Finally consider the case of public wages. A variant of Theorem 12 (Exorbitant
Wages) also remains intact: all optimal partitions must have pi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1
and – with the Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption – there exists an optimal
schedule with pl ≤ (λwmin +
∑l
i=1 di)/M < 1 and wl = M. As with secret wages, we
can no longer assert uniqueness of the optimal wage-title schedule.
Let us outline the changes needed in the proof of Theorem 12 for establishing this
variant. Notice first that we must once again have exactly one cut in each interval
J iH , for if such a cut were missing then wages would have to be the same for J
i
L
and J iH as these two intervals get the same title; and thus i would have no incentive
to work whatsoever. Now, as pointed out earlier, the formulae for wage bill (resp.
status incentive) are preserved if we replace Ni (resp. Ni and Ni − 1) by N i = θiN
(resp. N∗i = θi(N − 1) = [(N − 1)/N ]N i). With these substitutions we can literally
repeat the proof of Theorem 11; indeed, the estimates for changes in the wage bill,
as we go through the wage-schedule modifications prescribed in that proof, will be
the same exact expressions as before, replacing NiNi−1 (or, NiNi+1) in the proof by
[(N−1)/N ]N iN i−1 (or, [(N−1)/N ]N iN i+1) throughout. The reason is that changes
in the wage bill are the product of two terms:
(a) changes in the wage (which compensate for changes in status incentive, and
therefore involve terms N∗i ); and
(b) the expected number of workers for whom that change is occuring ( which
involve N i)
But products like N iN∗i−1are equal to [(N − 1)/N ]N iN i−1. This summarizes the
main changes, and the rest of the argument proceeds exactly as before. It shows that
positive reductions are achieved in the wage bill whenever we increase pi < 1 to pi+ε
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, hence such pi = 1 as claimed; and when we lower pl, the wage bill
is unaffected (instead of being strictly reduced), establishing the claim regarding pl
and wl.
Thus exorbitant wages must occur with complete information and constitute one
of the feasible optima if there is incomplete information. This leads us to conjecture
that exorbitant wages become necessary for any information regime that is in between
the two. The modeling of such information regimes and the precise formulation of
the result is left to future research.
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7 Appendix
We begin with a series of lemmas that will be helpful for proving both theorems.
Recall that for any subset A ⊂ Q, we let f(A) =
∑
x∈A f(x) and g(A) =∑
x∈A g(x).
Incentive Lemma: Let a cell C = L ∪ R in a partition P be the union of two


















then the incentive to work is strictly improved, left unchanged, strictly worsened (re-
spectively) by splitting C into L and R.
Proof: Splitting C changes the incentive to work by f(R)g(L)− f(L)g(R).
Merger Lemma: Suppose inside domination holds separately on two consecutive





then inside domination holds on the single cell L ∪R.
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If the cut occurs inside L, an analogous proof works. If the cut divides L from R,
there is nothing to prove.
Splitting Lemma: Suppose inside dominaton holds on a cell C = L ∪ R that is





then inside dominaton holds separately on each of the cells L,R.











proving that R satisfies inside dominaton. A similar argument applies to L.
Though uniform domination is stronger than domination, the two become equiv-
alent when they are opposed:
Constant Ratio Lemma: If X uniformly dominates Y on the interval [c, d] and






for all a, b ∈ [c, d].
Proof: Since X %U Y on [c, d],
f(b)
g(b)
is weakly increasing in b ∈ [c, d]. However, since Y % X on [c, d], taking a cut just
before the last element d gives
Pr(X ∈ [c, d))
Pr(Y ∈ [c, d)) ≥
f(d)
g(d)
These two conditions are compatible only if f(b)/g(b) is constant for b ∈ [c, d]. 
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Constant Incentive Lemma: Suppose the partition P satisfies inside dominaton
and that the partiton P ′ satisfies outside domination. If P ′ is a refinement of P,
then f(A)g(A) is a constant across the cells A of P
′ that subdivide any cell C of P;
consequently both partitions give the same status incentive.
Proof: On any cell C of P, Y dominates X by the inside domination hypothesis on
P. But across the cells of P ′ that subdivide this cell C of P, X uniformly dominates
Y by the outside domination hypothesis on P ′. Hence, by the Constant Ratio Lemma,
f(A)
g(A) is a constant across the cells A of P
′ that subdivide C. Therefore by the Incentive
Lemma, incentives are the same for P and P ′.
Tail Lemma: Let P be a partition of Q into consecutive cells {..., E < B, ...}
that satisfies inside and outside domination with respect to X and Y . Suppose that





















Join-Meet Lemma: Suppose the partitions P and P ′ each satisfy inside and out-
side domination. Then so do their join and meet.
Proof: Let B∨ < A∨ be any two consecutive cells of the join P ∨ P ′ . The cut







Thus f/g is increasing over the cells of P∨P ′ as we move to the right, proving outside
domination for P ∨ P ′ . By the Splitting Lemma, inside domination holds for each
cell of P ∨ P ′ contained in any cell of P or P ′ , and hence it holds in every cell of
P ∨ P ′ . Thus inside and outside domination hold for the join.
By the Constant Ratio Lemma, inside domination on P and inside domination
on P ′ then imply that f/g is constant over all the cells from P ∨ P ′ that lie in the
same cell of P and over all the cells from P ∨P ′ that lie in the same cell of P ′. Hence
f/g is constant over all the cells from P ∨ P ′ that lie in any cell of P ∧ P ′. Hence
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by the merger lemma, the inside condition holds on each cell of P ∧ P ′. The outside
condition for the meet follows from the simple fact that f/g is rising across the cells
of the join.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Inside-Outside Condition):
Proof of Necessity: If the inside condition is violated when some cell C of an
optimal partition P is cut into two consecutive cells L < R, then (by the incentive
lemma), splitting C improves incentives, contradicting the optimality of P. Similarly,
if f/g strictly falls across two consecutive cells of P, then (by the incentive lemma)
merging them strictly increases incentives. Hence f/g must be (weakly) increasing
across all cells of P.
Proof of Suffi ciency: Suppose P satisfies the inside and outside conditions.
Since Q is finite, there must trivially exist an optimal partition P̄ . By the necessity
proof, P̄ satisfies the inside and outside conditions. By the Join-Meet Lemma and
the Constant Incentive Lemma, the meet P ∧ P̄ and the join P ∨ P̄ give the same
incentive as both P and P̄ , proving that P is also optimal.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure): By Theorem 1 and the Join-Meet
lemma, the optimal title partitions form a lattice as claimed. Let C be a cell in
the maximal optimal partition P∗. If some cut of C into consecutive intervals L < R
leaves the ratios f(L)/g(L) = f(R)/g(R), then (by the incentive lemma) it also leaves
incentives unchanged when C is split into L and R, contradicting the maximality of
P∗. Hence the inside condition must always hold strictly on cells of P∗.
Next, let L < R be consecutive cells of the minimal optimal partition P∗. Again,
if f(L)/g(L) = f(R)/g(R), then (by the incentive lemma) it also leaves incentives
unchanged when L and R are merged into C = L ∪ R, contradicting the miminality
of P∗. Hence the outside condition must always hold strictly on cells of P∗.
Consider a partition P obtained via any subset of the cuts of the join P∗ that
includes all the cuts of the meet P∗. By the constant ratio lemma, f/g is constant
across the cells of P∗ that lie in the same cell of P∗ Hence by the merger lemma,
the new partition P∗ must also satisfy the inside condition on each of its cells. It
obviously inherits the outside condition from P∗. Hence P is optimal by Theorem
1.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Coarse Partition): If there were a cut between x and y,







Proof of Lemma 2 (Fine Partition): This is an immediate corollary of Theorem
1.






for any two unequal intervals A,B of Q. By the constant ratio lemma, any optimal
partition that is finer than the minimal optimal partition P∗ must produce an equality
on cells that lie in the same cell of P∗.
For what follows it will be useful to recall a standard property of stochastic
dominance (see e.g. Shaked-Shanthikumar 1994).
Lemma (Dominance Increases Expectation) : Suppose that Y dominates X











where the inequality is strict if φ is not constant, and Y strictly dominates X.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the number of values φ takes on. If it takes on
just one value, there is nothing to prove. So assume the theorem is true if φ takes on
k values. Now consider a φ which takes on k + 1 values c1 < ... < ck < ck+1. Let C ′
be the right tail of C on which φ takes its maximal value ck+1. Define φ′ by leaving




(ck+1 − ck)g(C ′) ≤
1
f(C)
(ck+1 − ck)f(C ′)



























where again the inequality is strict if g strictly dominates f .
Proof of Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Pure Wages and Pure Titles) Let
w : Q → [wmin,∞), be any wage schedule in W that is not measurable wrt the
maximal optimal titles partition P∗. We shall construct another wage schedule w∗ ∈
W that is measurable wrt the maximal optimal titles partition P∗ and creates a
strictly higher incentive to work than w does.
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(If f(C) = 0, set wC = max{w(x) : x < C}; otherwise, wC exists because of the in-







for every C ∈ P∗. Hence the function w∗, made by patching wC across all C ∈ P∗, is
no more costly for the employer than w. By construction, the worker gets the same
utility payoff from both wage schedules. It remains to show that the shirker gets a
strictly lower utility payoff in w∗ than in w, implying that w∗ creates strictly more
incentive to work than w.
From Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure) , we know that g strictly dominates f on C.
Since u and w are both monotonic, so is u(w(q)), and hence by the Lemma above











with strict inequality on cells C on which w is not constant. So the change in the







from the above when f(C)g(C) > 0, and trivially when g(C) = 0, and also when
f(C) = 0, because in this last case wC ≤ w(q) for all q ∈ C. The change is strict on
every cell C on which w is not constant. Thus if w is not measurable with respect to
P∗, it is not optimal.
To prove the second half of the theorem, note first that feasible wage schedules
form a compact subset of the finite dimensional space RQ. By continuity of the total
wage bill, an optimal solution w exists, which by our proof is measurable with respect
to P∗. By averaging as above over cells of P∗ instead of P∗, we obtain a wage schedule
w∗ on P∗. By construction the expected utility to the worker remains the same, and
the wage bill does not go up. But since f/g is constant over the cells of P∗ which
constitute any given cell of P∗, the expected utility to the shirker has also remained
constant. Thus the incentive to work is unchanged. This proves that w∗ is also an
optimal wage schedule.
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Proof of Theorem 4 (Minimum Wage with Risk Aversion): By the outside
condition, f(Ci)/g(Ci) is weakly increasing in i. Hence if f(Ci) > g(Ci), then for all
j > i, f(Cj) > g(Cj). Hence f(Ci) ≤ g(Ci) for all i ≤ k. As just shown, the owner
is paying a constant wage wi on each cell Ci. Reducing all wi to wmin for all i ≤ k
reduces the wage bill and increases the incentive to work, unless already wi = wmin
for all i ≤ k.
Proof of Corollary to Theorem 4 (Uniqueness with Strict Risk Aversion)
From Theorem 3 (Compatibility of Wages and Titles) every optimal schedule w musr










[f(C`)− g(C`)]u(w`) ≥ d
wL+1 ≡ ∞ > wL ≥ ... ≥ w1 ≥ wmin ≡ w0
By Theorem 4 there is a k such that wi = wmin for all i ≤ k; and f(C`) > g(C`) for
all ` > k. If there are two distinct solutions, then at least one of them has wL > wmin,
otherwise both would be identically wmin. Now the half-half convex combination w∗
(of the two solutions) trivially satisfies the bottom sequence of linear inequalities and
leaves the minimand unchanged. Furthermore, since the two solutions agree (and are
equal to wmin) at every ` with f(C`) − g(C`) ≤ 0, the combination w∗ must satisfy
the first (incentive) constraint strictly on account of the strict concavity of u. We
can lower slightly all the wages in w∗ that are strictly above wmin, maintaining all
the constraints but lowering the wage bill, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5 (Wage Structure with Risk Aversion): From Theorem
3 (Compatibility of Wages and Titles) there is indeed an optimal schedule w that is
constant on each cell C` of P∗. Hence we may write the owner’s optimization problem
exactly as in the proof of the Corollary to Theorem 4, but with P∗ replaced with P∗.
Furthermore, by the same logic applied to P∗ as was applied to P∗ in the proof of
Theorem 4, we need only consider paying wi > wmin for cells with f(Ci) > g(Ci).
By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, there is µ > 0 such that for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ L with
f(C`) > g(C`),
f(C`)− µ[f(C`)− g(C`)]u′(w`) = 0 if w`−1 < w` < w`+1
≥ 0 if w`−1 ≤ w` < w`+1
≤ 0 if w`−1 < w` ≤ w`+1









The left hand term is the gain in incentive to work per expected dollar spent on
the margin in cell j. If the inequality were violated, then by increasing wj by very
small ε > 0 and decreasing wi by slightly more than εf(Cj)/f(Ci), the owner could
reduce his expected wage bill and increase the incentive to work. From the fact
that [f(C`) − g(C`)]/f(C`) = 1 − g(C`)/f(C`) is strictly increasing in `, because
f(C`)/g(C`) is strictly increasing across the cells of the minimal partition P∗, it
follows that u′(wj) < u′(wi) and so wi < wj . Thus not more than one cell can give
the same wage w > wmin (for call the first one i and call the last one j). The first
order conditions are then all equalities and the formula given by the theorem follows
from taking i = ` = j − 1 and rearranging terms. 
Proof of Theorem 6 (Trigger Wage with Risk Neutrality):: Now suppose
in the last theorem that u is linear. Then u
′(w`+1)
u′(w`)
can never be less than 1, and so
the optimal wage schedule given there pays w > wmin only on a single cell `∗ + 1.
If Ci lies below the top cell of P∗, then by Theorem 2 (Lattice Structure),
f(Ci)/g(Ci) < f(Ck)/g(Ck) and the modified patched wage would be strictly better
if wCi > wmin, establishing the second claim of the theorem.
Finally, if the finite set of numbers f(qj), g(qj) are chosen randomly according
to the Lebesgue measure over the nonnegative numbers, then with probability one
there will be a unique optimal titles partition, as mentioned earlier, and so P∗ = P ∗,
implying that the optimal wage must be the one indicated by the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with Risk Aversion): Since u is
strictly concave, by the Corollary to Theorem 4, wd and we are uniquely defined.
Let `∗e denote the last cell of P∗ on which we = wmin. Suppose that on cell `∗e + 1,
wd ≥ we. Then by Theorem 5 (Wage Structure with Risk Aversion), wd ≥ we for all






and so by the strict monotonicity of u′, if wd,` ≥ we,`, then wd,`+1 ≥ we,`+1. But
this would imply that wd(x) ≥ we(x) for all x, contradicting d < e. It follows that
wd,`∗e+1 < we,`∗e+1. By precisely the previous logic, wd,` < we,` for all cells ` > `
∗
e.
Moreover, we cannot have wd,`∗e > wmin = we,`∗e , for that would imply that f(C`∗e ) >












a contradiction. Thus wd = wmin on all cells of P∗ below `∗e, concluding the proof of
the first part of the theorem.









Consider now for λ > 1, w > 0 that







where the last inequality follows from strictly increasing relative risk aversion, as can
























from which the theorem follows (keeping in mind that wd(y) > wd(x) and we(y) >
we(x).
Proof of Theorem 8 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule): Consider the pair
(P∗, w∗) where P∗ is the maximal optimal titles partition and w∗ is any solution
to the pure wage problem with d∗ = d − Iσ(P∗) in place of d. Then by Theorem
5 (Wage Structure with Risk Aversion), w∗ is measurable with respect to P∗. Then
(P∗, w∗) is feasible, hence the total wage bill in w∗ is at least as high as the total
wage bill in the optimal w. It follows that Iσ(w) ≤ Iσ(w∗), since w∗ is an optimal
pure wage schedule. P generates status incentive Iσ(P) ≤ Iσ(P∗), since P∗ is an
optimal titles partition. Since (P, w) is optimal, we must have that the joint in-
centive Iσ(P) + I(w) ≥ d = Iσ(P∗) + I(w∗), and hence that Iσ(P) = Iσ(P∗) and
I(w) = I(w∗). Thus P solves the pure titles problem and w solves the pure wage
problem for d∗ = d− Iσ(P∗) = d− Iσ(P).
For generic f and g, Lemma 3 (Unicity of the Lattice) implies that P = P∗= P∗.
Proof of Theorem 9 (Star Wages): Immediate from Theorem 8 (Optimal Wage-
Title Schedule) and Theorem 6 (Trigger Wage with Risk Neutrality).
Proof of Theorem 10 (Status Creates Star-Like Wages): Raising σ is tanta-
mount to decreasing d in the pure wage problem, because the required wage incentive
is given by d−σIS . The result now follows from Theorem 7 (Trigger-Like Wages with
Risk Aversion).
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Proof of Lemma 4 (Cuts): Let us begin with a title partition defined by a finite
set of cuts. Since in equilibrium there is nobody in any of the intervals (biH , a
i+1
H ),
any cut in such an interval can be moved to ai+1H without hurting the status payoff
of any worker, and leaving unchanged or perhaps hurting the status payoff of the
unilateral shirker of type i. If there is not a cut at a1H , add it. This reduces (or leaves
unchanged) the status payoff of the shirker of type 1 without changing the status
payoff (under work or shirk) of anybody else, because in equilibrium there is nobody
below a1H .
Now suppose there is a cut at a1H and at least two cuts in some J
i
H . Remove the
highest of all the cuts in J iH . Notice first that this does not affect the status payoff of
any (worker or shirker) of type j < i, or of the shirker of type i, since they all come
below the second highest cut in J iH anyway. Thus the status incentives of employees
of types j < i are unaffected. The status payoff of any shirker of type j > i must
go down by at least as much as that of the worker of the same type; hence their
status incentives cannot decrease. Finally, the status payoff of a worker of type i can
only go up. Against workers of his own type, he always gets expected status payoff
of zero (by symmetry), and eliminating the cut increases (or leaves unchanged) his
probability of coming equal with workers of higher type. This proves the lemma by
iteratively removing all but the lowest cut from each interval J iH .
Proof of Lemma 5 (Optimal Pure Titles): From Lemma 4 (Cuts) we can
already assume that all the cuts are in the J iH , and that no J
i
H has more than one
cut. If any J iH had no cuts, then the status incentive to work of employees of type i
would be 0.
Proof of Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages): Suppose there is at least one cut in the
interval (bi−1H , a
i
H). Take the topmost such cut and move it right to a
i
H . Set the wage
for outputs between the old topmost cut and aiH equal to the wage on the left of the
old topmost cut, and leave all other wages the same. This restores the measurability
of wages. Moreover, this does not raise the wage of any unilaterally deviant shirker
of type i, nor does it lower the wage of the worker of type i. At the same time, the
status of the deviant shirker stays the same or goes down, while the status of the
worker of type i stays the same. Thus the status incentive to work for type i is also
not hurt. By iteratively moving cuts in this manner, we may assume that there are
no cuts in any of the intervals (bi−1H , a
i
H).
From this point we can repeat the argument in the proof of Lemma 4 (Cuts) and
show that in the new partition given there, the status incentive to work of every
employee is improved (or held constant). If wages are secret, they need not change,
and so total incentives have gone up or stayed the same. If wages are public, then the
removal of the top cut in J iH , (as in the proof of Lemma 4) might require a change
in the wage schedule to maintain measurability with respect to the titles partition.
Replace the wages on the cells just below and above the removed cut by the average
per capita wage over those two cells. This restores measurability of the wage schedule
and leaves the wage bill unchanged. The expected wage of a worker of type i stays
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the same or increases. Hence his expected utility of working must go up or stay the
same by concavity of his utility. His wage if he shirks is unaffected, hence his wage
incentive to work rises or stays the same. For any employee of type j > i, his wage if
he shirks either stays the same (in which case his working wage does too) or falls. If
his working wage wage falls at all, it must have been the same as his shirking wage,
and must fall by the same amount (with probability at most 1). Hence his incentive
to work cannot go down. 
Proof of Theorem 11 (Optimal Wage-Title Schedule with Secret Wages
and Risk Neutrality): As was said before, Lemma 6 (Cuts with Wages) already
guarantees that we need only consider at most one cut per J iH , defined by the vector
(pi1 = p1 = 1, pi2 ..., pik) giving rise to cuts cij (pij ) in J
ij
H , where the first cut comes
at a1H , corresponding to i1 = 1
Define the expected number of people vij in the region Vij from each cut cij to
the next cut cij+1 (assuming everybody works) by
νi1 = N1 +N2 + ...+Ni2−1 + (1− pi2)Ni2
and, for 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1
νij = pijNij +Nij+1 + ...+Nij+1−1 + (1− pij+1)Nij+1
and, finally
νik = pikNik +Nik+1 + ...+Ni`−1 +Ni`
Suppose now that we eliminate all the cuts except the one at a1H . The status
payoff of the shirker and the worker of type j /∈ {i1 = 1, i2, ..., ik} is unchanged.
The status payoff of the shirker of type 1 is unchanged, but the status payoff
(and hence the incentive) of the worker of type 1 goes up by the expected number of
workers above cut ci2
νi2 + νi3 + ...+ νik
since now when a type 1 employee works, he comes equal with all these other people.
For any employee of type ij ∈ {i2, ..., ik}, the status incentive after the cuts are
removed is zero! Prior to the removal, the status incentive of ij was
pij (νij−1 + νij − 1)
because when an employee of type ij worked, with probability (1 − pij ) he ended
up with the same status as a shirker, and with probability pij he gained status by
outranking all the people in region Vij−1 and coming equal with all the people in region
Vij (not counting himself). Thus the loss in status incentive is pij (νij−1 + νij − 1).
Given these changes in status incentives, it is possible to change the wages, in
fact to lower the total wage bill, and yet leave all the employees with the same total
incentive (i.e., status incentive plus wage incentive). First, recall that for outputs
below ci1 = c1 = a
1
H , the wage is at wmin. For outputs above ci1 lower all wages
by νi2 + νi3 + ... + νik . This restores the original total incentive of all employees of
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types below i2 and continues to leave unchanged the total incentive of each types
j /∈ {i1 = 1, i2, ..., ik}. By assumption, the resulting wages must still be strictly above
wmin. Otherwise, the employees of type 1 would now be incentivized to work without a
positive wage incentive (or indeed despite a negative wage incentive) contradicting our
assumption that status incentive alone can never overcome the disutility of working).
For outputs above ci2 , now raise all wages by νi1 +νi2−1 < νi1 +νi2 . This restores
the total incentive of employees of type i2 and leaves unchanged all other incentives.
Successively raise all wages for outputs above cij by νij−1 + νij − 1 < νij−1 + νij . As
before, this restores the total incentive of employees of type ij without changing any
other incentives. Thus the new wage schedule gives all employees precisely the same
total incentive as before.
We now show that the new wage schedule has a smaller total wage than the
original. We compute the change in the wage bill by multiplying the number of
workers by the change in their wages. The change in the total wage bill is thus
strictly less than
− (νi1 + νi2 + νi3 + ...+ νik)[νi2 + νi3 + ...+ νik ]
+ (νi2 + νi3 + ...+ νik)[νi1 + νi2 ]
+ (νi3 + ...+ νik)[νi2 + νi3 ] + ...
+ (νik)[νik−1 + νik ]
= 0
This shows that the original wage-title schedule can be strictly improved by another
wage-title schedule in which the title partition has just one cut at a1H .
But given a title partition with just one cut at a1H , it is evident (in view of our
Necessity-of-Wages Assumption) that the optimal secret wage schedule is as stated.
Proof of Theorem 12 (Exorbitant Elite Wages):: It will be useful to keep in
mind throughout that raising pi has the effect of raising Ĩi and Ĩi+1 and lowering Ĩi−1
without disturbing other incentives. Similarly, raising wi raises Ĩi and lowers Ĩi+1,
with no other effect.
We shall show inductively, starting with i = 1, that pi = 1 for all i = 1, ..., `− 1.
First note that, thanks to the Necessity of Wages Assumption, p1 > 0 and w1 > w0.
Suppose p1 < 1. Define w̃1 by w̃1 = (1 − p1)w0 + p1w1. Let the employer raise p1
to 1 and lower w1 to w̃1, leaving all other pi and wi unchanged. Clearly this does
not affect the wage bill. At the same time the status incentive of type 1 does not go
down (indeed it goes up, unless N1 = 1 and p2 = 1 when it remains the same); both
the status incentive and the wage incentive of type 2 go up (the first on account of
the rise in p1, and the second on account of the fall in w1); the incentives of players
of type 3, ..., l are undisturbed; and the wage incentive of type 1 does not go down
(indeed it goes up if u is strictly concave) as the following calculation shows:
u(w̃1)− u(w0) ≥ (1− p1)u(w0) + p1u(w1)− u(w0) = p1 [u(w1)− u(w0)]
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To sum up, the employer’s maneuver improves both status and wage incentives
of type 2, without hurting any other incentives and without raising the wage bill.
Next, the employer can decrease w2 by a small ε, and thus lower the wage bill. The
decrease of w2 has just two effects on incentives: it raises the wage incentive of type
3 and lowers the wage incentive of type 2 and, other than this, has no effect on any
other wage or status incentives (including the status incentive of type 2). For small
enough ε, the incentive of type 2 will not fall below his original (pre-maneuver) level.
Thus the principal does better, generating incentives that are no worse, for a lower
wage bill, a contradiction. We conclude that p1 = 1.
Inductively assume that p1 = · · · = pi−1 = 1 for i < `. If pi < 1, we shall reach a
contradiction by finding a cheaper way of providing the same incentives.
In what follows we shall be making small changes in wages to get from wj to
w̃j ,i.e., |wj − w̃j | < κε for some constant κ and infinitesimal ε.So, denoting the
derivative u′(wj) = λj , we shall write22 u(wj) − u(w̃j) = λj( wj − w̃j) (see the
Differentiability Assumption). Note that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ..... ≥ λ` since u is concave and
since w1 6 w2 6 .... 6 w`.
Set p̃i = pi + ε and set w̃i−1 to satisfy λi−1(w̃i−1 − wi−1) = εNi, i.e., w̃i−1 =
wi−1+λ
−1
i−1εNi. Then the status incentive of i−1 goes down by εNipi−1 = εNi, but his
wage incentive goes up by the same amount: since pi−1 = 1, we have pi−1(u(w̃i−1)−
u(wi−2)) = u(wi−1)−u(wi−2)+u(w̃i−1)−u(wi−1) = u(wi−1)−u(wi−2)+λi−1(λ−1i−1εNi)
= pi−1(u(wi−1)− u(wi−2)) + εNi.
Also, the status incentive of i goes up by
∆Ii(ε) ≡ ε[(Ni − 1) + (1− pi+1)Ni+1 +Ni−1].
This allows us to reduce his wage incentive by the same amount. So, set w̃i to satisfy
p̃i [ui(w̃i)− ui(w̃i−1)]−
p̃iλi(w̃i − w̃i−1) ≡ piλi(wi − wi−1)−∆Ii(ε), i.e.,
p̃i(w̃i − w̃i−1) ≡ pi(wi − wi−1)−
∆Ii(ε)
λi
For small ε, ∆Ii(ε) is small, so pi(wi − wi−1) > 0 implies that p̃i(w̃i − w̃i−1) > 0,
which in turn implies w̃i > w̃i−1, retaining the monotonicity of the revised wages.
We shall be assuming ε small enough to guarantee monotonicity in all future wage
revisions, without explicitly saying so.
Note that, since wi > wi−1 and pi + ε < 1 (if pi < 1 and ε is small) and λi−1 1 λi
22This to be understood as a first-order approximation, ignoring all higher-order effects. Strictly
speaking we should replace λj with a number between u′(wj) and u′(w̃j). But the reader may easily
check that our argument below holds, mutatis mutandis,with these strictly correct λ′s in place of
ours (to represent exactly, rather than approximately, the changes in wage-utilities).
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(ε(Ni−1 − 1)) ≤ wi
Finally, the status incentive of i+ 1 goes up by
∆Ii+1(ε) ≡ εpi+1Ni.
Therefore the wage incentive of i + 1 can be reduced by the same amount. So set
w̃i+1 to satisfy
pi+1λi+1(w̃i+1 − w̃i) = pi+1λi+1(wi+1 − wi)−∆Ii+1(ε), i.e.,




Since w̃i < wi, clearly w̃i+1 < wi+1. Hence recursively setting
w̃j − w̃j−1 = wj − wj−1 for j > i+ 1
further lowers wages without changing incentives.
It remains to show that the wage bill defined in the owner minimization problem
has gone down. The only terms that increase are
wi−1Ni and pi−1(wi−1 − wi−2)Ni−1
while many terms are reduced, including
pi(wi − wi−1)Ni and pi+1(wi+1 − wi)Ni+1.





















(εN2i + εNiNi−1 + εNi(Ni+1 − 1)).
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( the inequality following from the fact that λi−1 ≥ λi ≥ λi+1 on account of the
concavity of u). Since Ni+1 ≥ 1, the reduction is at least as big as the increase. But
we have ignored many other strictly positive reductions (for example in wi+1Ni+1).
This contradiction proves that pi = 1, for i = 2, ..., ` − 1 and establishes part (a) of
the theorem.
Now suppose w` < M . Since we assumed p`(w`−w`−1) > 0, clearly p` > 0. Lower
p` by ε. This raises the status incentive of type `− 1 workers by εN`, enabling us to
lower the wage incentive for type `− 1 by the same amount.
Recalling that p`−1 = 1, and (by the Asymptotic Risk Neutrality Assumption)
w`−2 > w
τ so that λ`−1 = λ` = λ, set w̃`−1 to satisfy




This drop in p` unfortunately lowers the status incentive of type ` by ε(N` − 1 +
N`−1). Therefore we must raise the wage incentive of `, choosing w̃` to solve
(p` − ε)(w̃` − w̃`−1) = p`(w` − w`−1) +
ε(N`−1 +N` − 1)
λ
.
Fortunately, there is no group `+ 1 to be affected by the change in p`, which is why
it will turn out to be optimal to lower p` as long as w` < M , whereas it was shown
to be optimal to raise pi all the way to 1 for any i < `.
Indeed the terms in the wage bill that change are
w`−1N` + p`−1(w`−1 − w`−2)N`−1 + p`(w` − w`−1)N`.
The net change in those terms, by our estimates above, is
1
λ




showing that the wage bill can be reduced, a contradiction. This proves that w` = M .
Having proved that pi = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, it follows that the status
incentives for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 2 are given by Ii = Ii`(1, ..., 1, p`) = Ni + Ni−1 − 1. Hence
the wages are recursively determined (starting from w0 = wmin) for 1 ≤ i ≤ `− 2 by
the equation
u(wi)− u(wi−1) = di − Ii = di − (Ni +Ni−1 − 1).
Next, it will be convenient to scale the money by λ. Accordingly denote w∗j = λwj ,
M∗ = λM etc. Then we also have
w∗`−1 − w∗`−2 = d`−1 − [N`−2 +N`−1 + (1− p`)N` − 1]
andε
M∗ − w∗`−1 =
d`
p`
− [N`−1 +N` − 1]
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(recalling that w` ≡ M,hence w∗` ≡ M∗, in the last equation). We now show that
there is a unique solution w∗`−1, p` of these two simultaneous equations, so that the
optimal wage schedule is determined uniquely. To do this, we add the two equations
to get a convex quadratic in the single unknown p`. We then show that it has a
positive value at p` = 0 and a negative value at p` = 1 and therefore a unique
solution p` in (0, 1).
More precisely, multiplying each equation by p` and then adding them yields
−p`(M∗−w∗`−2−d`−1)−p`(N`−2+N`−1−1)−N`p`(1−p`)+d`−p`(N`−1+N`−1) = 0
i.e. f(p`) = 0, say. Clearly f(0) = d` > 0. Also, since λwi−λwi−1 ≤ u(wi)−u(wi−1) 6
di for 1 ≤ i ≤ `−1 ( the first inequality following from the concavity of u, the second
from the fact wage incentive plus title incentive equals disutility), we have
w∗i ≤ w∗min + d1 + ...+ di
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, and in particular for i = ` − 2. This, in conjunction with
M∗ > d1 + ...+ d` and Ni ≥ 1, implies f(1) < 0.
Finally, since the wage incentive of ` is at most d`, we have
p`(M




















Proof of Corollary to Theorem 12: The incentive formulae are trivially gener-
ated by plugging pi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1 into the status incentives for each agent,
and by observing that p` ≤ [wmin +
∑`
i=1 di]/M ≈ 0 if M is large.
The wage differentials were explicitly computed in the proof of Theorem 12.
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